A test of the core solution in finite strategy non-sidepayment games |
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Authors: | H.A. Michener K. Potter C.G. Depies G.B. Macheel |
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Affiliation: | Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin - Madison, Madison, WI 53706, USA |
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Abstract: | This paper reports a test of the core solution in cooperative non-sidepayment games where players have finite strategy sets. Two laboratory experiments were conducted with three-person and four-person games; in both experiments, the core solution was tested competitively against the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set and the imputation set. Predictions from these solution concepts were computed under parameters of α-effectiveness and strict preference. Results show that the frequency of outcomes falling in core is substantially higher than that observed in previous experiments (most of which involve sidepayment games). In addition, goodness-of-fit tests show that the core solution predicts the observed outcomes more accurately than do the stable set or the imputation set. |
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Keywords: | Cooperative non-sidepayment games core alpha-effectiveness finite strategy games von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set |
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