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Allocation rules for coalitional network games
Institution:1. CES, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris, France;2. CEREC, Saint-Louis University–Brussels, Belgium;3. CORE, University of Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium;1. Department of Economics, Seoul National University, Seoul 151-746, Republic of Korea;2. Economics & Management Research Institute, KT, Seoul 110-777, Republic of Korea;3. Research Group in Economic Analysis, Facultade de Econòmicas, Universidade de Vigo, 36310 Vigo (Pontevedra), Spain;1. Research Group in Economic Analysis, Universidade de Vigo, Spain;2. Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Spain;3. CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium;1. Department of Econometrics and Tinbergen Institute, VU University, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands;2. School of Economics and Key Laboratory of Mathematical Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, 111 Wuchuan Rd, Shanghai 200433, PR China;3. China Center for Special Economic Zone Research, Shenzhen University, Nanhai Ave 3688, Shenzhen, Guangdong 518060, PR China;1. School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, 1-6-1 Nishi-Waseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8050, Japan;2. Faculty of Economics, Fukuoka University, 8-19-1 Nanakuma, Jonan-ku, Fukuoka 814-0180, Japan;1. CRESE EA3190, Univ. Bourgogne Franche-Comté, F-25000 Besançon, France;2. Université de Saint-Etienne, CNRS UMR 5824 GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, France
Abstract:Coalitional network games are real-valued functions defined on a set of players organized into a network and a coalition structure. We adopt a flexible approach assuming that players organize themselves the best way possible by forming the efficient coalitional network structure. We propose two allocation rules that distribute the value of the efficient coalitional network structure: the atom-based flexible coalitional network allocation rule and the player-based flexible coalitional network allocation rule.
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