Evolutionary game model for a marketing cooperative with penalty for unfaithfulness |
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| Authors: | Zoltán Varga Antonino Scarelli Ross Cressman József Garay |
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| Institution: | 1. Institute of Mathematics and Informatics, Szent István University, Godollo, Hungary;2. Department of Ecology and Economic Sustainable Development, University of Tuscia, Viterbo, Italy;3. Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada;4. Ecological Modelling Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Science, Department of Plant Taxonomy and Ecology, L. Eötvös University, Budapest, Hungary |
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| Abstract: | A game-theoretical model for the behaviour in a marketing cooperative is proposed. For the strategy choice an evolutionary dynamics is introduced. Considering a model with penalty for unfaithfulness and Cournot type market situation, it is shown that, if the penalty is effective then this strategy dynamics drives the players towards an attractive solution, a particular type of Nash equilibrium. A model with redistribution of penalty is also studied. For the symmetric case, on the basis of stability analysis of the strategy dynamics, in terms of the model parameters, sufficient conditions are provided for the strategy choice to converge to a strict Nash equilibrium. |
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