On Cournot-Nash equilibria with exogenous uncertainty |
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Authors: | J Aaftink N Ireland M Sertel |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Applied Mathematics, Twente University of Technology, Enschede, Holland;(2) Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Warwick, England;(3) Department of Economics, Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey |
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Abstract: | A large body of literature has accumulated which examines how the optimal solution of an agent maximizing the expectation of a real-valued function, depending on a random parameterp and the agent's behaviorx, reacts to perturbations in the first and second moments ofp. Here, by an approximation valid for small uncertainty, we allow many agents and consider their behavior in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. We also allowp to depend on the behaviors of the participating agents. We apply the analysis to two models, one of a Cournot oligopoly, the other of a cooperative of individuals where there is uncertainty in the return to communal work.The second and third authors are grateful to the British Council (Academic Links and Interchange Scheme) for financial support. |
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Keywords: | Noncooperative games Cournot-Nash equilibrium parameter uncertainty oligopoly collective farm |
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