Efficient promotion strategies in hierarchical organizations |
| |
Authors: | Alessandro Pluchino Andrea Rapisarda |
| |
Affiliation: | a Dipartimento di Fisica e Astronomia, Universitá di Catania, and INFN sezione di Catania, Via S. Sofia 64, I-95123 Catania, Italyb Dipartimento di Sociologia e Metodi delle Scienze Sociali, Universitá di Catania, Via Vittorio Emanuele II 8, I-95131 Catania, Italy |
| |
Abstract: | The Peter principle has recently been investigated by means of an agent-based simulation, and its validity has been numerically corroborated. It has been confirmed that, within certain conditions, it can really influence in a negative way the efficiency of a pyramidal organization adopting meritocratic promotions. It was also found that, in order to bypass these effects, alternative promotion strategies should be adopted, as for example a random selection choice. In this paper, within the same line of research, we study promotion strategies in a more realistic hierarchical and modular organization, and we show the robustness of our previous results, extending their validity to a more general context. We also discuss why the adoption of these strategies could be useful for real organizations. |
| |
Keywords: | Peter principle Organization efficiency Promotion strategies Game theory Agent-based models |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|