复杂产业网络上的技术创新博弈扩散研究

创新的价值在于扩散,但扩散依赖于路径选择与扩散规则.提出了技术创新扩散的一对多博弈模型,并求解出了Nash均衡解.Nash均衡表明,传播者采取扩散策略的概率与学习者的学习成本和拒绝代价之差成正比;学习者采取学习策略的概率不但与传播者的封锁成本成正比,而且与网络的平均度成正比;进而,基于马尔科夫链的吸收态,进一步分析了产业网络上技术创新博弈扩散的平均步数;基于平均场理论,分析了产业网络上技术创新博弈扩散的分布及其分布密度.最后,通过长三角IC产业网络给出了实证分析.

Research on the Game Spreading of Technical Innovation on Complex Industrial Network

The real value of innovation lies on its diffusion,but the diffusion depends on the choice of path and the rules of spreading.The 1 VS n game is presented,and its solution of Nash Equilibrium is also analyzed.The Nash equilibrium shows that the diffusing probability of disseminator is proportional to the difference of studying cost and rejecting cost of studier,the studying probability of studier is not only proportional to the quarantine cost of disseminator,but also to the average degree of network.Then,the average steps of technical innovation diffusion on industrial network are analyzed based on the absorbing status of Markov chain;Based on the theory of mean field,the distribution and its density are also analyzed in the paper.At last,the analyses of demonstration are showed by through the industrial network of changjiang delta.