Values for two-stage games: Another view of the Shapley axioms |
| |
Authors: | A. Beja I. Gilboa |
| |
Affiliation: | 1. Tel Aviv University, Israel 2. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA 3. Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, USA
|
| |
Abstract: | This short study reports an application of the Shapley value axioms to a new concept of two-stage games. In these games, the formation of a coalition in the first stage entitles its members to play a prespecified cooperative game at the second stage. The original Shapley axioms have natural equivalents in the new framework, and we show the existence of (non-unique) values and semivalues for two stage games, analogous to those defined by the corresponding axioms for the conventional (one-stage) games. However, we also prove that all semivalues (hence, perforce, all values) must give patently unacceptable solutions for some two-stage majority games (where the members of a majority coalition play a conventional majority game). Our reservations about these prescribed values are related to Roth's (1980) criticism of Shapley's -transfer value for non-transferable utility (NTU) games. But our analysis has wider scope than Roth's example, and the argument that it offers appears to be more conclusive. The study also indicates how the values and semivalues for two-stage games can be naturally generalized to apply for multi-stage games.Earlier versions of this study were presented at the International Conference on Game Theory and its Applications, organized by Ohio State University in 1987, and at the Workshop on Mathematical Economics and Game Theory at Tel Aviv Unversity. We gratefully acknowledge the valuable comments received on both occasions, especially those of Robert J. Aumann, Roy Gardner, Sergiu Hart, Ehud Kalai, Michael Maschler, Alvin E. Roth, and Lloyd S. Shapley, and also those ofIJGT's anonymous referees. Of course, all responsibility lies with us. |
| |
Keywords: | Shapley Values Shapley Axioms Majority Games Two-Stage Games |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|