A consistent value for games with n players and r alternatives |
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Authors: | Edward M. Bolger |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio 45056, USA (e-mail: bolgerem@muohio.edu), US |
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Abstract: | In Bolger [1993], an efficient value was obtained for a class of games called games with n players and r alternatives. In these games, each of the n players must choose one and only one of the r alternatives. This value can be used to determine a player’s “a priori” value in such a game. In this paper, we show that the value has a consistency property similar to the “consistency” for TU games in Hart/Mas-Colell [1989] and we present a set of axioms (including consistency) which characterizes this value. The games considered in this paper differ from the multi-choice games considered by Hsiao and Raghavan [1993]. They consider games in which the actions of the players are ordered in the sense that, if i >j, then action i carries more “weight” than action j. These games also differ from partition function games in that the worth of a coalition depends not only on the partitioning of the players but also on the action chosen by each subset of the partition. Received: April 1994/final version: June 1999 |
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Keywords: | :n-person multi-choice games values consistency |
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