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Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results
Authors:Peter H Knudsen  Lars Peter ?sterdal
Institution:1. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
2. Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej 55, 5230, Odense, Denmark
Abstract:Allocation rules for cooperative games can be manipulated by coalitions merging into single players, or, conversely, players splitting into a number of smaller units. This paper collects some (im)possibility results on merging- and splitting-proofness of (core) allocation rules for cooperative games with side-payments.
Keywords:
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