基于产品生命周期的闭环供应链定价和协调策略研究

研究产品生命周期条件下一个制造商、一个零售商组成的闭环供应链的定价和协调策略:制造商第一周期只生产新品,从第二周期开始生产再制造品,并负责回收。建立了两周期、多周期和无限周期下的分散决策模型和多周期下的集中决策模型,得到最优定价和生产策略。结果表明:两周期中,制造商和零售商应根据不同的成本节约额制定不同的批发价、零售价和生产量。多周期中,当成本节约额比较小时,除第一和最后一个周期外,制造商和零售商应采取相同的定价和生产策略;当成本节约额比较大时,除第一和最后两个周期外,制造商和零售商应采取相同的定价和生产策略。无限周期中,除第一周期以外,制造商和零售商都应该采取相同的定价和生产策略。在有限周期情况下,制造商和零售商应通过在前期制定比较低的批发价和零售价,以提高生产量和销售量,使得后期的回收量增大,达到降低成本的目的。通过引入收益共享契约制定合适的批发价和销售收入及再制造收益共享比率可以协调整个闭环供应链。算例验证了上述结论。

Research on Pricing and Coordination Policies Based on Product Life-Cycle in Closed-Loop Supply Chain

This study deals with the pricing and coordination policies based on product life-cycle in closed-supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, where the manufacturer makes and supplies all-new products in the first period and uses returned cores to offer remanufactured products, along with the new ones, in the subsequence periods until the end of product life-cycle. We build a decentralized model in two-period, multi-period and infinite planning horizons and a centralized model in multi-period and characterize the optimal pricing and manufacturing strategy for the manufacturer and the retailer. The result suggests that in the two-period setting the manufacturer and the retailer should make different wholesale price, sales price and production quantity according to different cost savings, and in the multi-period setting the manufacturer and the retailer should adopt the same pricing and manufacturing strategies except the first and the last period with the low cost savings and adopt the same pricing and manufacturing strategies except the first period and the last two periods with the high cost savings, and in the infinite-horizon setting the manufacturer and the retailer should make the same pricing and manufacturing strategies except the first period. The manufacturer and the retailer should make lower price in the earlier periods to provide cores that are essential for the low cost production in the later periods. The whole closed-loop supply chain can be coordinated with revenue sharing contract. A numerical example is given to prove the conclusions above.