Nash Equilibria in a Differential Game of Economic Growth |
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| Authors: | C. González-Alcón J. Sicilia J. A. Álvarez |
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| Affiliation: | (1) Department of Statistics, Operations Research, and Computation, University of La Laguna, La Laguna, Tenerife, Spain;(2) Department of Statistics, Operations Research, and Computation, University of La Laguna, La Laguna, Tenerife, Spain;(3) Department of Economics of Institutions, Statistical Economy, and Econometrics, University of La Laguna, La Laguna, Tenerife, Spain |
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| Abstract: | The present work studies a dynamic game of economic growth with two phases or periods. In the first phase, a political process exists where an institutional framework is fixed, that is, limits to the workers share in the national income, minimum limits of consumption by capitalists, and discretionality in investment are specified. This framework conditions the actions of the players (capitalists and workers). In the second phase, the Nash equilibria of the game are calculated. Lastly, the sensitivity of the results with respect to the institutional parameters is analyzed for a given scenario. |
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| Keywords: | Differential games Nash equilibria economic models economic growth |
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