政府奖励与惩罚机制下闭环供应链网络均衡的互补模型

为研究政府经济政策对闭环供应链的影响,以非线性互补理论为基本工具,分别得到了在政府奖励机制与惩罚机制下,制造商负责回收的闭环供应链网络的各层均衡及整体均衡条件、经济解释及对应的非线性互补模型.最后通过数值算例验证了模型的正确性与有效性,其分析结果表明当政府预期的最低回收率较低时,惩罚机制优于奖励机制;当政府预期的最低回收率较高时,奖励机制优于惩罚机制.政府部门为了达到预期的最低回收率目标,可以适当调整奖励因子与惩罚因子.

The Complementarity Model of Closed-loop Supply Chain Network Equilibrium Based on Government's Premium Mechanism & Penalty Mechanism

To study the impact of government's economic policy on closed-loop supply chain,the paper uses nonlinear complementarity theory as the basic tool to establish complementarity models of the closed-loop supply chain network equilibrium under government's premium mechanism or penalty mechanism,respectively.It proposes equilibrium conditions of the various tiers as well as the economic interpretation and the corresponding nonlinear complementarity models of the closed-loop supply chain network recycled by manufacturers. Finally,a numerical example is given to illustrate the rationality as well as the effectiveness of the model,which demonstrates that when the minimum recovery ruled by the government is lower,the penalty mechanism is superior to the premium mechanism.In contrast,when the minimum recovery ruled by the government is higher,the penalty mechanism is inferior to the premium mechanism.In order to achieve the desired goal of the minimum recovery rate,the government department can adjust the premium factor and the penalty factor.