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基于质量安全投入的乳制品企业与经销商合作沟通机制形成的演化博弈分析
引用本文:王磊.基于质量安全投入的乳制品企业与经销商合作沟通机制形成的演化博弈分析[J].运筹与管理,2019,28(12):95-105.
作者姓名:王磊
作者单位:东北农业大学 经济管理学院,黑龙江 哈尔滨 150030
基金项目:黑龙江省自然科学基金项目(QC2017081);国家自然科学基金项目(71704020);教育部人文社会研究科学项目(13YJC630166);黑龙江省博士后启动项目(LBH-Q17019);黑龙江省博士后资助项目(LBH-Z13048);东北农业大学‘学术骨干’基金资助项目(18XG29);教育部留学基金项目(201806615041)
摘    要:从我国乳制品企业和经销商尽快建立规范、高效的沟通机制的客观要求出发,本文探讨了乳制品企业和经销商之间的演化博弈关系。在阐述乳制品企业和经销商合作策略的基础上,基于有限理性,应用演化博弈模型分析基于质量安全投入的乳制品企业和经销商合作沟通机制形成的长期演化趋势,并运用Matlab 6.0软件对研究结果进行仿真分析。研究发现,降低经销商的“质量安全投入”成本、降低乳制品企业采取“建立沟通机制”所支付的成本、提高经销商的销售额外收益、增加在“质量安全不投入”策略下乳制品企业采取“不建立沟通机制”所多付出的损失成本、增加在“建立沟通机制”策略下经销商采取“质量安全不投入”所需缴纳的罚金、增加在“不建立沟通机制”策略下经销商给乳制品企业带来的损失,有助于乳制品企业和经销商合作沟通机制的形成。

关 键 词:乳制品企业  经销商  演化博弈  造假  追溯  
收稿时间:2018-12-24

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Cooperative Communication Mechanism between Dairy Enterprises and Distributors Based on Quality and Safety Input
WANG Lei.Evolutionary Game Analysis of Cooperative Communication Mechanism between Dairy Enterprises and Distributors Based on Quality and Safety Input[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2019,28(12):95-105.
Authors:WANG Lei
Institution:College of Economic and Management, Northeast Agricultural University, Harbin 150030, China
Abstract:The paper discusses the relation of evolutionary game between dairy product enterprises and dealers from objective requirement of our government to establish defect dairy product recall system as soon as possible. On the basis of cooperation strategy of dairy product enterprises and dealers, we analyze a long term evolutionary trend between dairy product enterprises and dealers on bounded rationality with evolutionary game. Then we use the Matlab 6.0 software to simulate the research results. The studies show that it is helpful to build cooperative relation’s stability of dairy product enterprises and dealers, including reducing costs of dealer’s ‘quality and safety input’, dairy products enterprise’s ‘building communication mechanism’ and enhancing dealer’s additional benefits. Under the ‘no input in quality and safety’ strategy, dairy companies should increase failure costs, adopting ‘no establishment in communication mechanism’. Under the ‘setting up a communication mechanism’ strategy, dealers should increase necessary penalty, adopting ‘no input in quality and safety’. Under the ‘no establishment in communication mechanism’ strategy, loss of dairy companies made by dealers increases. The above all contribute to the building of the system of cooperation and communication between the dairy companies and dealers.
Keywords:dairy product enterprise  dealer  evolutionary game  fraud  recall  
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