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前景理论视角下专利代理服务模式优化研究
引用本文:陈伟,林超然,李金秋,杨早立,林艳. 前景理论视角下专利代理服务模式优化研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2019, 28(12): 14-24. DOI: 10.12005/orms.2019.0268
作者姓名:陈伟  林超然  李金秋  杨早立  林艳
作者单位:1. 哈尔滨工程大学 经济管理学院,黑龙江 哈尔滨 150001;2. 北京工业大学 经济管理学院,北京 100124;3. 东北农业大学 经济管理学院,黑龙江 哈尔滨 150030
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(71704007);国家社会科学基金(19CJY048);哈尔滨工程大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(HEUCFW170906);黑龙江省科学基金项目(YQ2019G001);黑龙江省哲学社会科学研究规划项目(18GLB022)
摘    要:专利代理服务是知识产权服务体系中的重要组成,利用预期收益分配契约激励专利代理服务参与者,引导双方采取共赢的行为策略,是提高合作效率、提升专利代理服务效果的重要方向。在考虑决策者有限理性的基础上,提出一种专利代理服务预期收益分配方案,引入前景理论衡量心理因素对专利代理服务参与主体的影响,建立收益感知矩阵,构建演化博弈模型,刻画更贴近现实的认知决策过程,进而探讨技术发明人与专利代理机构之间的博弈关系和稳定策略,最后通过数值仿真揭示影响稳定策略的关键变量。结果表明:这种预期收益分配方案具有可行性,区别设置预期收益分配模式的违约处罚水平以及减小预期收益分成比重是避免违约、维持长期稳定合作的最佳途径。

关 键 词:专利代理  合作效率  前景理论  演化博弈  
收稿时间:2018-03-21

Research on the Optimization of Patent Agency Services from Perspective of Prospect Theory
CHEN Wei,LIN Chao-ran,LI Jin-qiu,YANG Zao-li,LIN Yan. Research on the Optimization of Patent Agency Services from Perspective of Prospect Theory[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2019, 28(12): 14-24. DOI: 10.12005/orms.2019.0268
Authors:CHEN Wei  LIN Chao-ran  LI Jin-qiu  YANG Zao-li  LIN Yan
Affiliation:1. School of Economics and Management, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin 150001, China;2. School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing 100124, China;3. School of Economics and Management, Northeast Agricultural University, Harbin 150030, China
Abstract:Patent agency services are important component of intellectual property services. By interest distribution contracts, participants are motivated to adopt a win-win behavioral strategy. It is an important direction to improve cooperation efficiency and enhance the effectiveness of patent agency services. Considering the limited rationality of decision makers, this paper proposes a prospective income distribution plan for patent agency services and introduces the prospect theory to measure the impact of psychological factors based on the limited rationality of decision-makers. Then, it establishes a gain perception matrix to construct the evolutionary game model and explore the game relationship and evolutionary stability strategy(ESS)between inventor and patent agency services. Through numerical simulation, the key variables influencing the evolutionary stability strategy are revealed. The results show that the prospective income distribution plan is feasible and the most efficient way to avoid default and maintain the stable operation of patented services is to increase the default penalty and reduce the share of long-term income.
Keywords:patent agency services   cooperation efficiency   prospect theory   evolutionary game theory  
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