Teacher-student interaction: A game theoretic extension of the economic theory of education |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Teachers College, Columbia University, 525 W. 120th St., Box 174, New York, NY 10027, United States;2. Department of Economics, Stanford University, 579 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305, United States;3. Teachers College, Columbia University and NBER, 525 W. 120th St., Box 174, New York, NY 10027, United States;1. University of Bristol, IZA;2. University of Bristol, IFS;3. University of Texas at Austin, PRC, NBER, IZA, CESifo, CEP;1. Brown Center on Education Policy, Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036, USA;2. Program on Education Policy and Governance, Harvard University, USA |
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| Abstract: | This paper employs the ‘economic theory of education’ to consider the joint interactive choices of student and teacher. Game theoretic analysis is applied extending the work begun by Correa (1974). It is shown that the relative degree of substitutability in the utility and achievement functions determines whether a student responds positively or negatively to the teacher's greater effort or harder grading. Conditions for the existence and stability of a non-cooperative equilibrium are investigated. Due to the public good nature of student achievement, the non-cooperative equilibrium will result in insufficient academic effort being allocated to academic achievement for Pareto optimality; and therefore, there is a need for binding cooperative agreements. |
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