Procedurally Rational Volunteers

The mixed-strategy equilibrium applied to the volunteer's dilemma (Diekmann, 1985 Diekmann , A. ( 1985 ). Volunteer's dilemma . Journal of Conflict Resolution , 29 , 605 – 610 .Crossref], Web of Science ®] , Google Scholar]) predicts that the probability that at least 1 bystander volunteers decreases, if the number of bystander increases. I argue that this prediction lacks empirical support and demonstrate that an alternative solution concept from the literature on bounded rationality, the procedurally rational equilibrium (Osborne &; Rubinstein, 1998 Osborne , M. J. &; Rubinstein , A. ( 1998 ). Games with procedurally rational players . American Economic Review , 88 , 834 – 847 .Web of Science ®] , Google Scholar]), yields alternative predictions. I supply some empirical evidence that the alternative solution concept fares better in explaining observed behavior in the volunteer's dilemma.