Punishment in optional public goods games |
| |
Authors: | Wang Zhen Xu Zhao-Jin Zhang Lian-Zhong |
| |
Affiliation: | School of Physics, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China;School of Science, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, China;School of Physics, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China |
| |
Abstract: | In this work, the optional public goods games with punishment are studied. By adopting the approximate best response dynamics, a micro model is given to explain the evolutionary process. Simultaneously, the magnitude of rationality is also considered. Under the condition of bounded rationality which provides a light to interpret phenomena in human society, the model leads to two types of equilibriums. One is the equilibrium without punishers and the other is the equilibrium including only punishers and cooperators. In addition, the effects of rationality on equilibriums are briefly investigated. |
| |
Keywords: | public goods games rationality equilibrium |
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 等数据库收录! |
| 点击此处可从《中国物理 B》浏览原始摘要信息 |
|
点击此处可从《中国物理 B》下载免费的PDF全文 |
|