A Warranted-assertability Defense of a Moorean Response to Skepticism |
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Authors: | Tim Black |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, California State University, 18111 Nordhoff Street, Northridge, CA 91330–8253, USA |
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Abstract: | According to a Moorean response to skepticism, the standards for knowledge are invariantly comparatively low, and we can know
across contexts all that we ordinarily take ourselves to know. It is incumbent upon the Moorean to defend his position by
explaining how, in contexts in which S seems to lack knowledge, S can nevertheless have knowledge. The explanation proposed
here relies on a warranted-assertability maneuver: Because we are warranted in asserting that S doesn’t know that p, it can
seem that S does in fact lack that piece of knowledge. Moreover, this warranted-assertability maneuver is unique and better
than similar maneuvers because it makes use of H. P. Grice’s general conversational rule of Quantity—“Do not make your contribution
more informative than is required”—in explaining why we are warranted in asserting that S doesn’t know that p.
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Keywords: | Warranted-assertability Mooreanism Skepticism Knowledge |
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