Strategic absentmindedness in finitely repeated games |
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Authors: | Ignacio García-Jurado Natividad Llorca Ana Meca Manuel A. Pulido Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Mathematics, Corunna University, Corunna, Spain;(2) Operations Research Center, Miguel Hernández University, Elche, Spain;(3) Department of Statistics and Operations Research, Murcia University, Murcia, Spain |
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Abstract: | In this paper we consider finitely repeated games in which players can unilaterally commit to behave in an absentminded way in some stages of the repeated game. We prove that the standard conditions for folk theorems can be substantially relaxed when players are able to make this kind of compromises, both in the Nash and in the subgame perfect case. We also analyze the relation of our model with the repeated games with unilateral commitments studied, for instance, in García-Jurado et al. (Int. Game Theory Rev. 2:129–139, 2000). Authors acknowledge the financial support of Ministerio de Educaci ón y Ciencia, FEDER and Fundación Séneca de la Región de Murcia through projects SEJ2005-07637-C02-02, ECO2008-03484-C02-02, MTM2005-09184-C02-02, MTM2008-06778-C02-01 and 08716/PI/08. |
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Keywords: | Repeated games Absentminded players Folk theorems Unilateral commitments |
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