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On price competition in location-price models with spatially separated markets
Authors:María Dolores García Pérez  Pascual Fernández Hernández  Blas Pelegrín Pelegrín
Institution:(1) Administración y Dirección de Empresas, Universidad Católica San Antonio, 30107 Guadalupe, Murcia, Spain;(2) Departmento de Estadística e Investigación Operativa Facultad de Matemáticas, Campus del Espinardo, Universidad de Murcia, 30100 Espinardo, Murcia, Spain
Abstract:In this paper we study price competition for two types of location-price models in which facility locations are set up and price decisions have to be made in order to maximise profit. We discuss the existence and determination of equilibrium prices in a general location space when facilities have different production costs. It is assumed that each price is bounded from below and demand for a single homogeneous product is price-inelastic. When facilities set mill prices, a price equilibrium rarely exists and necessary conditions for existence are obtained. In particular, when the location space is a tree network, we give a characterisation of the locations for which a unique equilibrium exists for two competitors. With spatial price discrimination, though equilibrium prices might not exist, it is shown that ε-equilibrium prices always exist for any locations of the facilities. A characterisation of ε-equilibrium is also given. Then the location-price problem is reduced to a location problem. A comparison of results with the two types of price determination is also presented. This work has been supported by the Ministry of Science and Technology of Spain under the research project BEC2002-01026, in part financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).
Keywords:Competitive location  equilibrium prices  non-cooperative games
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