Slightly Altruistic Equilibria |
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Authors: | G De Marco J Morgan |
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Institution: | (1) Dipartimento di Statistica e Matematica per la Ricerca Economica, Università degli Studi di Napoli Parthenope, via Medina 40, 80133 Napoli, Italy;(2) Dipartimento di Matematica e Statistica, Università di Napoli Federico II, Via Cinthia, Napoli, 80126, Italy |
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Abstract: | We introduce a refinement concept for Nash equilibria (slightly altruistic equilibrium) defined by a limit process and which
captures the idea of reciprocal altruism as presented in Binmore (Proceedings of the XV Italian Meeting on Game Theory and
Applications, 2003]). Existence is guaranteed for every finite game and for a large class of games with a continuum of strategies. Results and
examples emphasize the (lack of) connections with classical refinement concepts. Finally, it is shown that, under a pseudomonotonicity
assumption on a particular operator associated to the game, it is possible, by selecting slightly altruistic equilibria, to
eliminate those equilibria in which a player can switch to a strategy that is better for the others without leaving the set
of equilibria.
Part of the results in this paper have been presented at: First Spain, Italy, Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory, Maastricht,
2005; Fifth International ISDG Workshop, Segovia, 2005; GATE, Université Lumière Lyon 2, 2005; XXX AMASES Workshop, Trieste
2006; CSEF, Università di Salerno, 2006. |
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Keywords: | Nash equilibrium Refinements Altruistic behavior Friendliness Pseudomonotone operators |
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