On subgame perfect equilibria in quantum Stackelberg duopoly with incomplete information |
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Authors: | Piotr Frąckiewicz |
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Affiliation: | Institute of Mathematics, Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, Pomeranian University, 76-200 S?upsk, Poland |
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Abstract: | The Li–Du–Massar quantum duopoly model is one of the generally accepted quantum game schemes. It has applications in a wide range of duopoly problems. Our purpose is to study Stackelberg's duopoly with incomplete information in the quantum domain. The result of Lo and Kiang has shown that the correlation of players' quantities caused by the quantum entanglement enhances the first-mover advantage in the game. Our work demonstrates that there is no first-mover advantage if the players' actions are maximally correlated. Furthermore, we proved that the second mover gains a higher equilibrium payoff than the first one. |
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Keywords: | Quantum game Stackelberg duopoly Incomplete information Subgame perfect equilibrium |
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