主体异质性下风险联合投资演化博弈模型研究

在前人相关研究基础上,将主体异质性等更符合实际的影响因素引入到风险联合投资演化博弈模型中,求出了模型的演化稳定策略,并对影响演化稳定策略的相关因素进行了分析,博弈一方的合作策略选择视对方的合作均衡策略而定,但联合投资的合作行为终将演化为一博弈方选择不合作策略而终止.主体的异质性与单位冲突成本收益对促进双方都选择合作策略造成很大影响,异质性程度差异程度越大,单位冲突成本收益越小,联合投资成功的可能性就越大,合作行为也会因双方遵守合约契约而得到长期稳定的维持.

The Evolutionary Game Model of Syndication in Venture Capital under Agent Heterogeneity

On the basis of this previous studies,this paper set up an evolutionary game of venture capital syndication by taking into account the following two main factors: agent heterogeneity and benefit-to-cost ratio, solved evolutionary stable strategy,and analyzed how the relevant factors affected the evolutionary stable strategy.It points out that the strategy choice of corporation will depend on the probability of the other corporation' Nash equilibrium strategy, but syndicated cooperative behavior will eventually terminate because of one corporation'breaking down the contract.Agent heterogeneity and benefit-to-cost ratio affect the two parties' cooperative behavior.If agent heterogeneity increases, and benefit-to-cost ratio decreases, the probability of syndication success increases accordingly.The syndicated cooperative behavior will steadily maintain for a long time because the two game parties abide by contracts.