企业管理者接受外部董事职务模型研究

管理者担任外部董事是否从公司股东利益最大化角度出发?为什么公司会允许他们的管理者接受外部董事职位?围绕这些问题建立收益—成本模型来说明兼职外部董事是否会影响公司价值,以及怎样影响公司的价值,模型说明管理者兼任外部董事的数量往往超过公司的最优数量。但是,只要管理者有科学、合理的激励约束机制,可以避免管理者过度兼职的问题,而不必对管理者兼职行为进行限制。

A model of Executives' Accepting of External Directorships in the Corporation

Whether executives＇ accepting of external directorship is in the best interests of firm stockholders？ Why do firms allow their executives to accept outside directorships？ To explain these questions, we develop a cost-benefit model to research the influence of external directorship on corporation value. Our model illustrates that executives will choose to spend more time on external directorships than that is optimal for the home firm, but it is not necessary to restrict the number of external directorship of executives under the reasonable incentive mechanism, for scientific incentive mechanism can avoid excessive external directorships.