| 基于委托代理理论的渠道成员激励机制分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 田剑. 基于委托代理理论的渠道成员激励机制分析[J]. 数理统计与管理, 2008, 27(6) |
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| 作者姓名： | 田剑 |
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| 作者单位： | 江苏科技大学经济管理学院,江苏,镇江,212003 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金，江苏省镇江市软科学项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 渠道冲突管理是渠道管理的重要内容,而渠道冲突管理的核心是设计有效的渠道成员激励机制。本文通过建立渠道成员激励的委托代理模型,得到渠道成员努力水平可以观测和不可观测下的最优激励合同,并对边际产出、成本系数、绝对风险规避程度、不确定性随机变量方差等因素对渠道成员激励机制的影响进行探讨。
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| 关 键 词： | 委托代理理论 渠道冲突 激励机制 |
Analysis of Incentive Mechanism of Channel Member Based on Principal-agent Theory |
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| TIAN Jian. Analysis of Incentive Mechanism of Channel Member Based on Principal-agent Theory[J]. Application of Statistics and Management, 2008, 27(6) |
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| Authors: | TIAN Jian |
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| Affiliation: | TIAN Jian School of Economics and Management,Jiangsu University of Science and Technology,Jiangsu Zhengjiang 212003,China |
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| Abstract: | The channel conflict management is an important part of channel management and effective incentive mechanism design is the core issue of channel conflict management. A incentive model of channel member based on principal-agent theory is discussed in this paper. By calculating, the optimal incentive contracts are given when the effort level of channel member can be investigated or not. The influence of marginal production, coefficient of cost, level of absolute risk reversion, variance of uncertain random variable on incentive mechanism is explored. |
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| Keywords: | principal-agent channel conflict incentive mechanism |
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