海关走私监管的演化博弈分析

利用演化博弈的方法对海关缉私部门和走私商之间相互作用时的策略，进行了分析。结果表明：当企业进行走私活动的收益大于不走私的收益、海关缉私部门对走私企业处罚力度过轻或对缉私检查的成本过高时，走私必然发生。要确保走私的发生率降低，就必须对进行走私的企业进行严惩，降低其的预期收益。同时，要加强缉私队伍建设。

Evolutionary Game Analysis between Custom Inspector and Smuggler

Analyzing the strategies' choice on the interaction between the custom inspector and smuggler with the evolutionary game theory. The result shows that when the profit for smuggle enterprises is more than don' t、the punishment on the enterprises who smuggle is too light or the monitoring cost of the custom supervision department is too large, then the rate of smuggle is high. For decreasing the smuggle, punishing the enterprises that take part in smuggle reducing their expected profit, at the same time ,we should reduce the monitoring cost.