Prisoner's Dilemma on Co-Evolving Networks without Strategy Update |
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Authors: | DAI Qiong-Lin YANG Jun-Zhong |
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Institution: | School of Science, Beijing University of Posts andTelecommunications, Beijing 100088 |
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Abstract: | We investigate the game theory in a structured population with the assumption that the evolution of network structure is far faster than that of strategy update. We find that the degree distribution for the final network consists of two distinct parts: the low degree part which is contributed to by defectors and a broadband in the regime with high degree which is formed by cooperators. The structure of the final network and the final strategy pattern have also been numerically proved to be independent of the game parameters. |
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Keywords: | 02 50 Le 87 23 Kg 89 75 Fb |
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