首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     


A dynamic free-entry oligopoly with sluggish entry and exit adjustments
Authors:Yasuhito Tanaka
Abstract:We study a dynamic free-entry oligopoly with sluggish entry and exit of firms under general demand and cost functions. We show that the number of firms in a steady-state open-loop solution for a dynamic free-entry oligopoly is smaller than that at static equilibrium and that the number of firms in a steady-state memoryless closed-loop solution is larger than that in an open-loop solution.
Keywords:Correspondence to: Faculty of Economics, Doshisha University, Kamigyo-ku, Kyoto, 602-8580, Japan.  Free-entry oligopoly  Differential game  Open-loop  Memoryless closed-loop
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号