Evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game with the third-order reputation evaluation

In this letter, in order to deeply explore the role of individual reputation in the evolutionary game dynamics, we present a new third-order reputation evaluation model to discuss the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game. In the current model, we should not only consider the strategy (cooperation, C or defection, D) of a focal player, but also take his own reputation and his opponent's reputation status into account. Among them, the individual reputation will be divided into being good and bad according to the specified threshold, and the good player will be endowed with the more influential strategy transfer ability, which further helps to create the clusters of cooperative and good players within the population and then fosters the cooperation. A large plethora of experimental simulation results indicate that four rules under the third-order reputation mechanism can lead to the promotion of cooperation when compared to the traditional public goods game model. The current work is conductive to a better understanding of the persistence and emergence of collective cooperation in real-world systems.