Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game |
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Authors: | Ryusuke Shinohara |
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Affiliation: | 1. Faculty of Economics, Shinshu University, 3-1-1, Asahi, Matsumoto, Nagano, 390-8621, Japan
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Abstract: | We examine the coalition-proof equilibria of a participation game in the provision of a (pure) public good. We study which Nash equilibria are achieved through cooperation, and we investigate coalition-proof equilibria under strict and weak domination. We show that under some incentive condition, (i) a profile of strategies is a coalition-proof equilibrium under strict domination if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium that is not strictly Pareto-dominated by any other Nash equilibrium and (ii) every strict Nash equilibrium for non-participants is a coalition-proof equilibrium under weak domination. |
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