Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum colonel Blotto games |
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| Authors: | Rafael Hortala-Vallve Aniol Llorente-Saguer |
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| Affiliation: | (1) Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, 53113 Bonn, Germany;(2) BonnEconLab, Laboratory for Experimental Economics, Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenaueralle 24-42, 53113 Bonn, Germany |
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| Abstract: | We analyze a Colonel Blotto game in which opposing parties have differing relative intensities. In other words, the game is non-zero sum because colonels have asymmetric and heterogeneous battlefield valuations. We characterize the colonels’ payoffs that sustain a pure strategy equilibrium and present an algorithm that reaches the equilibrium actions (when they exist). Finally we show that the set of games with a pure strategy equilibria is non-empty. |
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