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Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games
Authors:Marilda Sotomayor
Affiliation:1. Department of Economics, Universidade de S?o Paulo, Cidade Universitária, Av. Prof. Luciano Gualberto 908, S?o Paulo, SP, 05508-900, Brazil
2. Department of Economics, Brown University, 64 Waterman Street, Providence, RI, USA
Abstract:Stability of matchings was proved to be a new cooperative equilibrium concept in Sotomayor (Dynamics and equilibrium: essays in honor to D. Gale, 1992). That paper introduces the innovation of treating as multi-dimensional the payoff of a player with a quota greater than one. This is done for the many-to-many matching model with additively separable utilities, for which the stability concept is defined. It is then proved, via linear programming, that the set of stable outcomes is nonempty and it may be strictly bigger than the set of dual solutions and strictly smaller than the core. The present paper defines a general concept of stability and shows that this concept is a natural solution concept, stronger than the core concept, for a much more general coalitional game than a matching game. Instead of mutual agreements inside partnerships, the players are allowed to make collective agreements inside coalitions of any size and to distribute his labor among them. A collective agreement determines the level of labor at which the coalition operates and the division, among its members, of the income generated by the coalition. An allocation specifies a set of collective agreements for each player.
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