| 城市再生水BOT项目特许经营权竞标机制设计 |
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| 引用本文： | 严培胜,高成修. 城市再生水BOT项目特许经营权竞标机制设计[J]. 数学杂志, 2015, 35(5): 1269-1274 |
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| 作者姓名： | 严培胜 高成修 |
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| 作者单位： | 湖北经济学院统计学院, 湖北 武汉 430205,武汉大学数学与统计学院, 湖北 武汉 430072 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助(71071119;71231007;61173061);国家哲学社会科学基金资助(12BGL027);湖北省教育厅项目资助(Q20121903;14G289);湖北水事研究中心项目资助(2013B007) |
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| 摘 要： | 本文研究了城市再生水BOT项目特许经营权竞标机制设计问题.运用激励机制设计思想建立了满足个体理性和激励相容约束的拍卖模型,并通过求解此模型得到了最优的拍卖机制.最优拍卖机制不仅能诱导企业真实地披露自己的成本类型,还能提高政府对社会资源的配置效率.
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| 关 键 词： | BOT 特许经营权 歧视价格拍卖 激励机制 |
| 收稿时间： | 2013-11-20 |
| 修稿时间： | 2014-09-03 |
THE MECHANISM DESIGN FOR FRANCHISE BIDDING IN URBAN REUSED WATER BOT PROJECT |
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| YAN Pei-sheng and GAO Cheng-xiu. THE MECHANISM DESIGN FOR FRANCHISE BIDDING IN URBAN REUSED WATER BOT PROJECT[J]. Journal of Mathematics, 2015, 35(5): 1269-1274 |
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| Authors: | YAN Pei-sheng and GAO Cheng-xiu |
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| Affiliation: | School of Statistics and Mathematics, Hubei University of Economics, Wuhan 430205, China and School of Mathematics and Statistics, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China |
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| Abstract: | In this paper, we study the mechanism design for franchise bidding in urban reused water BOT project. The model of bidding is established based on the incentive mechanism, which is incentive compatible and individual rationality. Then the optimal biding mechanism is obtained by solving the model. The optimal bidding mechanism not only can induce the enterprises to disclose their true cost type, but also can improve the governments'' allocation efficiency. |
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| Keywords: | BOT franchise bidding discriminatory auction incentive mechanism |
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