带有网络外部性的动态寡头垄断定价

给出了带有网络外部性的两阶段寡头垄断定价模型,并用博弈论方法求解.通过与带有网络外部性的完全垄断定价模型的比较,得出重要结论:在网络外部性足够大的情况下,①寡头竞争情况下与完全垄断下情况一样,“科斯假设”将得到克服,均衡定价将呈现先低后高的情况.②对于完全垄断厂商来说,网络外部性k的增加能够增加其利润,但对于寡头竞争的企业来说,正好相反,k的增加将导致其利润的下降.

Dynamic Duopoly Pricing Model with Network Externalities

This paper analyzes a two-stage duopoly pricing model with network externalities,and gives the solution by game theory.The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is compared with that in dynamic monopoly pricing model with network externalities.We show that: when network externalities are of sufficient magnitude,① Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium prices increase as time passesiust as in dynamic monopoly pricing model,thus Coase conjecture can be overcome.② On the contrary in dynamic monopoly pricing model,the stronger of network externalities,the less profits enterprises can get in duopoly pricing model.