基于半参数单指标方法的公司治理研究

本文以1995-2000年间我国所有上市公司CEO更换的数据为样本,应用半参数单指标方法(single-index semi-parametric methods)分析影响上市公司CEO强制更换的因素,对公司治理的效率进行了初步的判断。研究表明:(1)强制性CEO更换与公司业绩、银行短期贷款比率负相关;(2)当最大股东为国有商业机构时,CEO被强制更换的几率比较大;(3)最大股东的持股比率未能对强制性CEO更换起到显著解释作用。总体而言,公司的治理起到一定的作用。但是银行作为债权人,应加强对上市公司的监管。

Corporate Performance Based on Single-index Semi-parametric Methods

Based on the data of CEO turnover in all Chinese listed companies from 1995 to 2000,we analyze which factors influence CEOs' turnover by empirical study using single-index semi-parametric method in this paper.The research results are:there exists a negative relationship between forced executive turnover rate and corporation performance,also between forced executive turnover rate and the level of bank short term loan financing;when the largest shareholder is state-owned business organization, the probability that CEO is forcedly took placed is little;the share holding rate of the largest shareholder can not significantly explain the forced CEOs' turnover.Overall,corporate governance is effective,but the bank should strengthen supervision to the listed company as a creditor.