Cooperative Dynamics in Lattice-Embedded Scale-Free Networks

We investigate cooperative behaviors of lattice-embeddedscale-free networking agents in the prisoner's dilemma game model byemploying two initial strategy distribution mechanisms, which are specificdistribution to the most connected sites (hubs) and random distribution. Ourstudy indicates that the game dynamics crucially depends on the underlyingspatial network structure with different strategy distribution mechanism.The cooperators' specific distribution contributes to an enhanced level ofcooperation in the system compared with random one, and cooperation isrobust to cooperators' specific distribution but fragile to defectors' specific distribution. Especially, unlike the specific case, increasing heterogeneity of network does not always favor the emergence of cooperation under random mechanism. Furthermore, we study the geographical effects and find that the graphically constrained network structure tends to improve the evolution of cooperation in random case and in specific one for a large temptation to defect.