A noncontextualist account of contextualist linguistic data |
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Authors: | Mylan Engel |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Northern Illinois University, 60115 DeKalb, IL, USA |
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Abstract: | The paper takes as its starting point the observation that people can be led to retract knowledge claims when presented with
previously ignored error possibilities, but offers a noncontextualist explanation of the data. Fallibilist epistemologies
are committed to the existence of two kinds of Kp-falsifying contingencies: (i) Non-Ignorable contingencies NI-contingencies] and (ii) Properly-Ignorable contingencies PI-contingencies]. For S to know that p, S must be in an epistemic position to rule out all NI-contingencies, but she need not be able to rule out the PI-contingencies.
What is required vis-à-vis PI-contingencies is that they all be false. In mentioning PI-contingencies, an interlocutor can lead S mistakenly to think that these contingencies are NI-contingencies, when in fact they are not. Since S cannot rule out these newly mentioned contingencies and since she mistakenly takes them to be NI-contingencies, it is quite natural that she retract her earlier knowledge claim. In short, mentioning NI-contingencies creates a distortion
effect. It makes S think that the standards for knowledge are higher than they actually are, which in turn explains why she mistakenly thinks
she lacks knowledge. Conclusion: The primary linguistic data offered in support of contextualism can be explained without
resorting to contextualism. |
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Keywords: | contextualism fallibilism relevant alternatives knowledge error possibilities |
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