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Conjectural variations equilibrium in a mixed duopoly |
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| Authors: | Vyacheslav Kalashnikov Claudia Kemfert Vitaly Kalashnikov |
| Institution: | 1. Systems Engineering Department, ITESM, Campus Monterrey, av. Eugenio Garza Sada 2501 Sur, Monterrey, NL 64849, Mexico;2. DIW German Institute of Economics Research, Königin-Luise-Straße 5, 14195 Berlin, Germany;3. Department of Civil Engineering and Architecture, University Juárez of the State Durango, Av. Universidad S/N, 35070 Gómez Palacio, Dgo, Mexico |
| Abstract: | We study a mixed duopoly model, in which a state-owned (public) firm maximizing domestic social surplus and a private (foreign) firm compete. Under general enough assumptions, we first justify the concept of conjectural variations equilibrium (CVE) applied to the model by demonstrating concavity of the expected profit function of each agent. Next we establish existence and uniqueness results for the conjectural variations equilibrium in the described duopoly. A particular case of a CVE with constant influence (conjecture) coefficients is also examined. |
| Keywords: | Mixed duopoly Conjectural variations equilibrium Constant influence coefficients |
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