政府奖惩下供应链合作减排与低碳宣传的动态优化

为减少生产过程中碳排放对环境带来的不利影响,考虑到政府对制造商采取奖惩措施,以此为背景,针对供应链长期合作减排、低碳宣传的问题,构建微分博弈模型。考虑到产品需求受碳排放量和零售商低碳宣传努力的共同影响下,得出并分析了分散式和集中式决策下制造商和零售商的反馈均衡策略及产品碳排放量的最优轨迹,发现产品碳排放量的最优轨迹具有多种敛散性,且在集中式决策下实现了供应链利润和环境绩效的双赢。此外,还分析了政府奖惩力度对产品碳排放量的影响。最后结合算例对模型进行分析,为供应链的低碳化管理和政府奖惩政策的制定提供了理论参考。

Dyna mic Opti mization of Cooperation on Carbon E mission Reduction and Low-carbon Propaganda in Supply Chain under Pre miu m and Penalty of Govern ment

In order to reduce the adverse impact of carbon emissions on the environment during production,the premium and penalty of government on the manufacturer is taken into account.In this context,aimed at solving the problem of long-term cooperation on carbon emission reduction and low-carbon propaganda in a supply chain,the differential game model is constructed.It is considered that products’demand is influenced by both carbon emissions and retailers’low-carbon propaganda efforts.This paper obtains and analyzes the manufacturer’s and retailer’s feedback equilibrium strategies,and optimal trajectories of products’carbon emissions in the decen-tralized and centralized decision-making.It is found that the optimal trajectories of products’carbon emissions have a variety of convergence and divergence,and the win-win of the supply chain’s profit and environmental performance can be achieved in the centralized decision-making.In addition,the impact of premium and penalty strength of government on the products’carbon emissions is analyzed.At last,the model is analyzed by the numerical simulation,which provides a theoretical reference for the low-carbon management of supply chain and the formulation of the premium and penalty policy of government.