| 考虑需求和质量双重风险的动力电池回收定价策略和协调机制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 卢超,赵梦园,陶杰,刘晨光,余江.考虑需求和质量双重风险的动力电池回收定价策略和协调机制研究[J].运筹与管理,2020,29(4):195-203. |
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| 作者姓名： | 卢超 赵梦园 陶杰 刘晨光 余江 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.上海大学 管理学院,上海 200444;2.上海理工大学 管理学院,上海 200093;3.西北工业大学 管理学院,陕西 西安 710072;4.中国科学院 科技战略咨询研究院,北京 100190;5.中国科学院 大学公共政策与管理学院,北京 100049 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71704101,71601117,71371153,71671139,71834006);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(17YJC630094);上海市“科技创新行动计划”软科学研究计划重点项目(18692108300)。 |
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| 摘 要： | 合理的定价策略和有效的协调机制是保障即将大量报废的动力电池实现回收利用的重要手段。本文同时考虑动力电池回收利用中来自市场的需求风险和来自回收渠道的质量风险,构建了两阶段逆向供应链分散式和集中式定价模型,发现分散决策下的最优回收价格始终低于集中决策下的最优回收价格,逆向供应链存在双重边际化现象;进一步,基于风险共享契约提出完全补偿契约来协调供应链,从而使供应链成员实现帕累托改进,并结合具体算例提出了相应的建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 动力电池回收 需求风险 质量风险 供应链协调 |
| 收稿时间： | 2018-06-23 |
Pricing Strategy and Coordination Mechanis m of Power Battery Recycling under the Dual Risks from Demand and Quality |
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| LU Chao,ZHAO Meng-yuan,TAO Jie,LIU Chen-guang,YU Jiang.Pricing Strategy and Coordination Mechanis m of Power Battery Recycling under the Dual Risks from Demand and Quality[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2020,29(4):195-203. |
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| Authors: | LU Chao ZHAO Meng-yuan TAO Jie LIU Chen-guang YU Jiang |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200444, China;2. Business School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, China;3. School of Management, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an 710072, China;4. Institutes of Science and Development, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China;5. School of Public Policy and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China |
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| Abstract: | A reasonable pricing strategy and an effective coordination mechanism play important roles in the recycling and utilization of power batteries. By taking both demand risk(from the market side) and quality risk(from the recycle channel) during power battery’s recycling and utilization into consideration, this paper constructs a two-stage reverse supply chain decentralized and centralized pricing model, and finds that the optimal recycling price under decentralized decision is always lower than that under centralized decision, and there is a double marginalization phenomenon in the reverse supply chain. Further, a risk sharing contract based complete compensation contract is proposed to coordinate the supply chain, which could help supply chain members to realize Pareto improvement. In addition, some suggestions are proposed through a concrete example analysis. |
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| Keywords: | power battery recycling demand risk quality risk supply chain coordination |
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