基于情绪宣泄效用的邻避冲突演化博弈

近年来,日益增多的邻避冲突事件使地方政府在社会治理方面陷入了一定的困境。邻避冲突的产生原因不仅仅在于利益和风险的分配不均,还在于社区民众对地方政府在决策及沟通方面存在着不满情绪。社区民众不满情绪的程度在邻避冲突进程中随着政府行为的不同而变化,随着不满情绪程度的上升,采取更激烈的抗议手段可以给民众带来更大的情绪宣泄效用。因此情绪宣泄效用可以从动机上对“中国式”邻避冲突的螺旋式演进态势提供有效的解释。本文构建了地方政府与社区民众的演化博弈模型,分析了演化均衡解及相关稳定性,对纯策略均衡解进行了数值模拟。结合博弈模型理论结果对杭州中泰垃圾焚烧项目邻避冲突事件进行了分析,最后对邻避设施规划建设给出了相关建议。

Evolutionary Game of NIMBY Conflict Based on Emotional Catharsis Utility

In recent years,increasing NIMBY conflicts troubled local government in social governance.NIMBY conflicts are not only caused by the uneven distribution of interests and risks,but also the dissatisfaction of the community residents in the decision-making and communication of local government.The degree of dissatisfaction of the community is changing with the governments behavior in the process of NIMBY.As the level of dissatisfaction rises,more intense protests can bring greater emotional catharsis utility to the public.Therefore,the emotional catharsis utility can provide an efective explanation for the spiral evolution of “Chinese-style”NIMBY conflicts.This paper proposes an evolutionary game model between local government and community people.The evolutionary equilibrium solution and related stability are numerically simulated and analyzed.A case study is carried out with the Hangzhou ZhongTai Waste Incineration Plant Project.It shows that the emotional catharsis utility can effectively explain the phenomenon of “Chinese-style”NIMBY spiral evolution from the viewpoint of game motive.Combined with the theoretical results of the game model,this paper analyzes the NIMBY conflict of Hangzhou ZhongTai waste incineration project.Finally,relevant suggestions for the planning and construction of NIMBY facilities are given.