基于演化博弈视角下的加盟式快递合作稳定性分析

针对我国加盟式快递企业逐渐暴露出的加盟商服务质量低下、各自为政、总部管理薄弱等引发的双方合作不稳定问题, 本研究以演化博弈模型为主要理论工具, 开发了不完全信息下快递公司总部和加盟商的行为交互演化博弈系统。通过雅克比矩阵求解, 揭示了博弈初始条件改变以及决策参数取值变动对演化稳定结果的影响;然后以申通公司为例, 采用MATLAB软件进行了数值仿真分析。研究表明, 当加盟商积极合作所增加的收益、快递公司总部的罚金、信息不对称程度和监督成本位于不同阈值区间时, 系统分别呈现出三种演化稳定结果和一种周期性的随机状态, 同时发现快递单价对促进博弈双方的合作稳定性具有积极作用。最后, ①降低快递加盟商服务成本, 提高服务质量;②建立适度的违约惩罚制度, 完善利润分配机制;③加强平台信息共享, 促进信息透明化;④营造良好的竞争氛围, 避免无谓的价格战, 有助于引导系统向理想状态演化。

Cooperative Stability Analysis of Franchise Express Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

The instability of the cooperation between the two parties is caused by the low service quality of the franchisees, their own affairs, the weak headquarters management and so on. Based on the evolutionary game model as the main theoretical tool, this paper develops an interactive evolutionary game system for expressing the behavior of company headquarters and affiliates under incomplete information.By solving Jacobian matrix, the influence of the change of initial conditions and decision parameters on the evolutionary stability results is revealed. Then, taking Stoexpress as an example, the numerical simulation is carried out by using MATLAB software. The results show that the system presents three evolutionary stable results and a periodic stochastic state when franchisors cooperate actively, and when the revenue, the fines, the degree of information asymmetry and the cost of supervision are located in different thresholds. Meanwhile, it is found that the unit price has a positive effect on the cooperation stability of the two parties. Finallyreducing the service cost of express franchisees and improving the quality of service, establishing a moderate penalty system for breach of contract and improving the profitdistribution mechanism, strengthening the information sharing of the platform and promoting the transparency of information, and creating a good competitive atmosphere and avoiding unnecessary price warfare will help guide the evolution of the system to the ideal state.