Coalitional games and contracts based on individual deviations |
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Authors: | Emiliya Lazarova Peter Borm Bas van Velzen |
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Institution: | 1.Queen’s University Management School,Queen’s University Belfast,Belfast,UK;2.CentER and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research,Tilburg University,Tilburg,The Netherlands |
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Abstract: | We study what coalitions form and how the members of each coalition split the coalition value in coalitional games in which
only individual deviations are allowed. In this context we employ three stability notions: individual, contractual, and compensational
stability. These notions differ in terms of the underlying contractual assumptions. We characterize the coalitional games
in which individually stable outcomes exist by means of the top-partition property. Furthermore, we show that any coalition
structure of maximum social worth is both contractually and compensationally stable. |
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