An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property |
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Authors: | René van den Brink |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Econometrics, Free University, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands (email: jrbrink@feweb.vu.nl), NL |
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Abstract: | In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TU-games using a fairness property. This property states that if to a game we add another game in which two players are symmetric then their payoffs change by the same amount. We show that the Shapley value is characterized by this fairness property, efficiency and the null player property. These three axioms also characterize the Shapley value on the class of simple games. Revised August 2001 |
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Keywords: | : TU-game Shapley value fairness simple games. |
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