Can realists know that they know? |
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Authors: | Murat Baç |
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Institution: | 1.Department of Philosophy,Bogazi?i University,Bebek, Istanbul,Turkey |
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Abstract: | Realists typically suppose that nonepistemic truth is an independent condition on propositional knowledge. Few philosophers,
however, have seriously questioned the meta-epistemic consequences of combining alethic and epistemic variants of realism.
In this paper I aim to show that the truth condition in the customary definition of knowledge presents an important problem
for the realist at higher epistemic levels. According to my argument, traditional epistemic-logical analyses of metaknowledge
fail because of their extensionalism and certain presuppositions they have about the satisfaction of the truth condition.
I further suggest that we need a different approach to metaknowledge if (1) we want to retain alethic realism, and (2) we
want our epistemological accounts to adequately explicate the meta-epistemic states of actual, evidence-bound cognitive agents.
This paper greatly benefited from the comments and criticisms of an anonymous referee for Acta Analytica. |
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Keywords: | evidence externalism the KK-thesis metaknowledge realism truth |
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