Some remarks on Reid on primary and secondary qualities |
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Authors: | Steffen Borge |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University, 541 Hall of Languages, 13244-1170 Syracuse, NY, USA |
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Abstract: | John Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities of objects has meet resistance. In this paper I bypass the
traditional critiques of the distinction and instead concentrate on two specific counterexamples to the distinction: Killer
yellow and the puzzle of multiple dispositions. One can accommodate these puzzles, I argue, by adopting Thomas Reid’s version
of the primary/secondary quality distinction, where the distinction is founded upon conceptual grounds. The primary/secondary
quality distinction is epistemic rather than metaphysical. A consequence of Reid’s primary/ secondary quality distinction
is that one must deny the original version of Molyneux’s question, while one must affirm an amended version of it. I show
that these two answers to Molyneux’s question are not at odds with current empirical research. |
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Keywords: | John Locke Thomas Reid primary/secondary quality distinction killer yellow puzzle of multiple dispositions Molyneux’ s question |
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