Monotonicity and Consistency in Matching Markets

Objective: To obtain axiomatic characterizations of the core of one-to-one and one-to-many matching markets. Methods: The axioms recently applied to characterize the core of assignment games were adapted to the models of this paper. Results: The core of one-to-one matching markets is characterized by two different lists of axioms. The first one consists of weak unanimity, population monotonicity, and Maskin monotonicity. The second consists of weak unanimity, population monotonicity, and consistency. If we allow for weak preferences, the core is characterized by weak unanimity, population monotonicity, Maskin monotonicity, and consistency. For one-to-many matchings, the same lists as for the case of strict preferences characterize the core. Conclusions: The cores of the discrete matching markets are characterized by axioms that almost overlap with the axioms characterizing the core of the continuous matching markets. This provides an axiomatic explanation for the observations in the literature that almost parallel properties are obtained for the core of the two models. We observe that Maskin monotonicity is closely related to consistency in matching marketsThis research is financially supported by Waseda University Grant for Special Research Projects #2000A−887, 21COE-GLOPE, and Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research #15530125, JSPS. This paper was presented at the 7th. International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare held in Osaka, Japan. The comments of the participants are gratefully acknowledged. The author thanks Professors William Thomson, Eiichi Miyagawa and anonymous referees for their valuable comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are independent