Infinite horizon noncooperative differential games with nonsmooth costs |
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Authors: | Fabio S. Priuli |
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Affiliation: | Department of Mathematical Sciences, NTNU, Alfred Getz vei 1, NO-7491, Trondheim, Norway |
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Abstract: | For a noncooperative differential game, the value functions of the various players satisfy a system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations. In the present paper, we study a class of infinite-horizon scalar games with either piecewise linear or piecewise smooth costs, exponentially discounted in time. By the analysis of the value functions, we find that results about existence and uniqueness of admissible solutions to the HJ system, and therefore of Nash equilibrium solutions in feedback form, can be recovered as in the smooth costs case, provided the costs are globally monotone. On the other hand, we present examples of costs such that the corresponding HJ system has infinitely many admissible solutions or no admissible solutions at all, suggesting that new concepts of equilibria may be needed to study games with general nonlinear costs. |
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Keywords: | Nonzero-sum differential game Nash equilibrium |
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