阈值风险下的多企业合作治理污染的演化博弈分析

针对环境污染具有跨区域性,环境资源的公共物品属性,由单一产污企业治理污染物难以取得有效成果,辖区内多个产污企业合作治理是环境保护的必由之路。 本文从演化博弈论的研究视角探讨了多个排污企业之间的决策演化过程,建立了多主体演化博弈模型,并考虑了污染排放总量超过总量阈值时的环境恶化风险,研究阈值风险对产污企业合作治理污染策略选择的影响。 研究结果表明,较高的治理成本很大地约束了逐利企业治理污染的行为选择,造成公地悲剧的社会问题。 企业治污成本较大背景下,环境阈值风险发生概率越高,越能有效促进合作治理环境策略的演化稳定,合作治理占优于不治理。 出于对企业自身初始禀赋的保护,产污企业初始禀赋越大、排污收费率越高,越能有效促进企业治理污染物的积极性。 最后,为促进辖区内污染企业合作治理污染提出了政策建议。

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Multiple Enterprises Cooperative Reducing Emissions with Collective Risk

Environmental pollution has significant cross-regional characteristics, and environmental resources have the characteristics of public goods. It is difficult to achieve effective results in the treatment of pollutants by single pollution-producing enterprises. Multi-enterprise cooperation within the same jurisdiction is the only way for environmental protection. This paper researches on the evolutionary process of decision among multiple enterprises from the perspective of evolutionary game theory. The evolutionary game model between multi-enterprises governments is established. Considering environmental degradation risk brought by total emissions more than the capacity threshold, we focus on the effect of risk on the emergence of cooperation to reduce emissions among enterprises. The results show that higher governance cost strongly constraints the behavior choice of profit-seeking enterprises to governance pollution, causing social dilemma-the tragedy of the commons. Based on higher governance cost, we find that the dilemma is relieved in high-risk situations where cooperation is likely to persist and dominate defection. Large initial endowment and emissions charges to enterprises can effectively promote the enterprise to control the pollutant discharging, in order to protect their private endowment. Finally, some policy suggestions for the implementation of environmental regulation are proposed.