基于互惠动机公平均衡的投资项目决策模型及数值模拟分析

针对博弈主体互惠动机公平偏好的证据和特征,本文从理论上描绘了首席执行官和项目经理在信息对称与非对称条件下的资本配置行为和激励合约的设计,在理论模型构建及均衡分析中发现:项目经理互惠动机公平偏好可以提高其努力水平,带来与显性激励合约一样的激励效果,即互惠动机公平偏好产生了“挤进激励效应”;互惠动机公平偏好使得项目经理真实地汇报项目质量状况,优化了公司对项目资本配置的计划,避免了非对称信息下的道德风险问题,即互惠动机公平偏好产生了“信号显示机制”的作用。由于项目经理互惠动机公平偏好的“挤进激励效应”,使得投资项目资本配置决策临界点不会很低,从而抑制了投资不足的严重性。本文的研究结果为具有异质性的项目经理提供了不同合约选择,把“自利”假设下委托代理决策的分析框架拓展到“非自利”的行为委托代理决策的分析框架。

Investment Projects Decision Model and Numerical Simulation Analysis Based on Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium

This paper attempts to describe the capital allocation decision making behavior and the incentive contracts design theoretically under the conditions of symmetric and asymmetric information, based on the evidence and the characteristics of the reciprocity of individuals. During the theoretical model construction and equilibrium analysis, the results show that managers’ concern over reciprocity can improve their effort level in the implementation of the project, accompanied by the similar effect which explicit incentive contract produces, that is, reciprocity considerations lead to “crowding-in effect”. The results also show that managers would like to report the truthful project quality when they are motivated by reciprocity. It optimizes the capital allocation plan and avoids the moral hazard problems under the condition of asymmetric information specific performance in the setting of sharing coefficient. Namely, the reciprocal motivation produces the role of “signal display mechanism”. Due to the “crowding-in effect”, the critical point of capital allocation to specific project is unlikely to be very low. The seriousness of underinvestment is restrained as well. The research results of this paper provide different contract options for project managers with heterogeneity, and expand the framework of the Principal-Agent Framework Decision under the assumption of “self-interest” to “non self-interest” behavior of agency decisions.